Reference Source

Which cryptographic algorithms and TLS certificate lifetimes stop being acceptable, and when?

Published .

Two different clocks get discussed as one. Certificate lifetimes are set by the CA/Browser Forum's Baseline Requirements, on dates already written into the document. Algorithm status is set by NIST, on a schedule of its own. Both are below, each row carrying the sentence it was read from.

The answer, in the publisher's own words

The certificate validity cap and the domain-validation reuse period, which fall on the same dates and not by the same factor. The reuse period is the one that decides whether a human can stay in the loop.

In force fromWhat takes effectSectionAuthority
2026-03-15Maximum validity period of Subscriber Certificates is 200 days.6.3.2CA/Browser Forum TLS Baseline Requirements
2026-03-15Domain Name and IP Address validation maximum data reuse period is 200 days.4.2.1CA/Browser Forum TLS Baseline Requirements
2027-03-15Maximum validity period of Subscriber Certificates is 100 days.6.3.2CA/Browser Forum TLS Baseline Requirements
2027-03-15Domain Name and IP Address validation maximum data reuse period is 100 days.4.2.1CA/Browser Forum TLS Baseline Requirements
2029-03-15Maximum validity period of Subscriber Certificates is 47 days.6.3.2CA/Browser Forum TLS Baseline Requirements
2029-03-15Domain Name and IP Address validation maximum data reuse period is 10 days.4.2.1CA/Browser Forum TLS Baseline Requirements

Where each line came from

2026-03-15.

2026-03-15 | 6.3.2 | Maximum validity period of Subscriber Certificates is 200 days.

Our record: /tls-certificate-requirement-effective-dates/ca-browser-forum-tls-baseline-requirements-6-3-2-maximum-validity-period-of-subscriber-certificates-is-200-days/. Quoted from <https://cabforum.org/working-groups/server/baseline-requirements/requirements/>, last checked 2026-09-24, due to be re-checked by 2026-12-23.

2026-03-15.

2026-03-15 | 4.2.1 | Domain Name and IP Address validation maximum data reuse period is 200 days.

Our record: /tls-certificate-requirement-effective-dates/ca-browser-forum-tls-baseline-requirements-4-2-1-domain-name-and-ip-address-validation-maximum-data-reuse-period-is-200-days/. Quoted from <https://cabforum.org/working-groups/server/baseline-requirements/requirements/>, last checked 2026-11-03, due to be re-checked by 2027-02-01.

2027-03-15.

2027-03-15 | 6.3.2 | Maximum validity period of Subscriber Certificates is 100 days.

Our record: /tls-certificate-requirement-effective-dates/ca-browser-forum-tls-baseline-requirements-6-3-2-maximum-validity-period-of-subscriber-certificates-is-100-days/. Quoted from <https://cabforum.org/working-groups/server/baseline-requirements/requirements/>, last checked 2026-11-03, due to be re-checked by 2027-02-01.

2027-03-15.

2027-03-15 | 4.2.1 | Domain Name and IP Address validation maximum data reuse period is 100 days.

Our record: /tls-certificate-requirement-effective-dates/ca-browser-forum-tls-baseline-requirements-4-2-1-domain-name-and-ip-address-validation-maximum-data-reuse-period-is-100-days/. Quoted from <https://cabforum.org/working-groups/server/baseline-requirements/requirements/>, last checked 2026-11-03, due to be re-checked by 2027-02-01.

2029-03-15.

2029-03-15 | 6.3.2 | Maximum validity period of Subscriber Certificates is 47 days.

Our record: /tls-certificate-requirement-effective-dates/ca-browser-forum-tls-baseline-requirements-6-3-2-maximum-validity-period-of-subscriber-certificates-is-47-days/. Quoted from <https://cabforum.org/working-groups/server/baseline-requirements/requirements/>, last checked 2026-11-03, due to be re-checked by 2027-02-01.

2029-03-15.

2029-03-15 | 4.2.1 | Domain Name and IP Address validation maximum data reuse period is 10 days.

Our record: /tls-certificate-requirement-effective-dates/ca-browser-forum-tls-baseline-requirements-4-2-1-domain-name-and-ip-address-validation-maximum-data-reuse-period-is-10-days/. Quoted from <https://cabforum.org/working-groups/server/baseline-requirements/requirements/>, last checked 2026-11-03, due to be re-checked by 2027-02-01.

Algorithm status, as our records hold it: what each algorithm's status is now, what is scheduled, and what NIST names as the replacement.

AlgorithmUsed forStatus nowScheduled changeReplacementDocument
224-bit hash functionshashingApprovedretirement scheduled under SP 800-131A Rev 3 draftSHA-2 or SHA-3 at 256-bit or higher outputSP 800-131A Rev 3 draft
AES-256encryptionApprovednot on the scheduleN/AIR 8547
Classical algorithms below 112-bit security strengthall purposesDisallowedminimum moves from 112 bits to 128 bits at the end of 2030algorithms at 128-bit security strength or higherSP 800-131A Rev 2 / Rev 3 draft
DSA (signature generation)digital signatureDeprecatedretired under SP 800-131A Rev 3 draftECDSA, EdDSA, or ML-DSA (FIPS 204)SP 800-131A Rev 3 draft
ECB confidentiality modeencryptionApprovedretired under SP 800-131A Rev 3 draftCBC, CTR, GCM, or other approved modesSP 800-131A Rev 3 draft
ECDHkey establishmentApproveddeprecated after 2030 and disallowed after 2035ML-KEM (FIPS 203)IR 8547
ECDSAdigital signatureApproveddeprecated after 2030 and disallowed after 2035ML-DSA (FIPS 204)IR 8547
EdDSAdigital signatureApproveddeprecated after 2030 and disallowed after 2035ML-DSA (FIPS 204)IR 8547
Falcondigital signatureselected for ongoing standardizationstandardization underwayN/A (this is a future post-quantum standard)NIST PQC project
HQCkey establishmentselected for ongoing standardizationstandardization underwayN/A (this is a future post-quantum standard)NIST PQC project
ML-DSA (FIPS 204)digital signatureApprovedpost-quantum standard, published August 2024N/A (this is the replacement)FIPS 204
ML-KEM (FIPS 203)key establishmentApprovedpost-quantum standard, published August 2024N/A (this is the replacement)FIPS 203
RSA (signatures)digital signatureApproveddeprecated after 2030 and disallowed after 2035ML-DSA (FIPS 204)IR 8547
RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 (signatures)digital signatureApproveddeprecated after 2030 and disallowed after 2035ML-DSA (FIPS 204)IR 8547
RSA key transportkey establishmentApproveddeprecated after 2030 and disallowed after 2035ML-KEM (FIPS 203)IR 8547
RSA-PSSdigital signatureApproveddeprecated after 2030 and disallowed after 2035ML-DSA (FIPS 204)IR 8547
SHA-1hashingDeprecatedretirement scheduled under SP 800-131A Rev 3 draftSHA-2 or SHA-3SP 800-131A Rev 3 draft
SHA-2 familyhashingApprovednot on the public-key scheduleN/AIR 8547
SHA-3 familyhashingApprovednot on the public-key scheduleN/AIR 8547
SLH-DSA (FIPS 205)digital signatureApprovedpost-quantum standard, published August 2024N/A (this is the replacement)FIPS 205
finite-field Diffie-Hellmankey establishmentApproveddeprecated after 2030 and disallowed after 2035ML-KEM (FIPS 203)IR 8547

Where each line came from

224-bit hash functions, DSA (signature generation), ECB confidentiality mode, SHA-1.

Rev. 3 proposes moving the minimum classical security strength from 112 bits to 128 bits at the end of 2030, retires ECB confidentiality mode and DSA signature generation, and schedules the retirement of SHA-1 and 224-bit hash functions.

Our record: /nist-cryptographic-algorithm-deprecation-schedule/224-bit-hash-functions/. Quoted from <https://www.encryptionconsulting.com/education-center/nist-ir-8547-sp-800-131a-algorithm-transitions/>, last checked 2026-11-15, due to be re-checked by 2027-05-14. Our record: /nist-cryptographic-algorithm-deprecation-schedule/dsa-signature-generation/. Quoted from <https://www.encryptionconsulting.com/education-center/nist-ir-8547-sp-800-131a-algorithm-transitions/>, last checked 2026-11-15, due to be re-checked by 2027-05-14. Our record: /nist-cryptographic-algorithm-deprecation-schedule/ecb-confidentiality-mode/. Quoted from <https://www.encryptionconsulting.com/education-center/nist-ir-8547-sp-800-131a-algorithm-transitions/>, last checked 2026-11-15, due to be re-checked by 2027-05-14. Our record: /nist-cryptographic-algorithm-deprecation-schedule/sha-1/. Quoted from <https://www.encryptionconsulting.com/education-center/nist-ir-8547-sp-800-131a-algorithm-transitions/>, last checked 2026-11-15, due to be re-checked by 2027-05-14.

AES-256.

It defines the formal approval status (approved, acceptable, deprecated, restricted, disallowed, or legacy use) of specific algorithms and key lengths, and it is the document a FIPS-validated implementation is measured against. The current finalized version is SP 800-131A Revision 2, published in March 2019. NIST released an initial public draft of Revision 3 in October 2024. Rev. 3 proposes moving the minimum classical security strength from 112 bits to 128 bits at the end of 2030, retires ECB confidentiality mode and DSA signature generation, and schedules the retirement of SHA-1 and 224-bit hash functions. To avoid forcing organizations through two separate transitions, NIST plans to fold the asymmetric-algorithm transition into the post-quantum transition rather than enforcing a separate 128-bit step for public-key algorithms. As of mid-2026, Revision 3 remains a draft, so Revision 2 is the version currently in force. What Is Not on the Schedule A common misreading is that everything cryptographic must change. It does not. The deprecation and disallowance timeline targets public-key cryptography specifically. AES-256 is not on the schedule: Grover’s algorithm offers only a quadratic speedup against symmetric ciphers, leaving AES-256 with roughly 128 bits of effective quantum security, which is acceptable for the foreseeable future. SHA-2 and SHA-3 are not on the public-key schedule: These hash families remain secure against quantum attacks at appropriate output sizes. (SHA-1 and 224-bit hashes are being retired for unrelated classical-strength reasons.) The exposure is public-key:

Our record: /nist-cryptographic-algorithm-deprecation-schedule/aes-256/. Quoted from <https://www.encryptionconsulting.com/education-center/nist-ir-8547-sp-800-131a-algorithm-transitions/>, last checked 2026-11-15, due to be re-checked by 2027-05-14.

Classical algorithms below 112-bit security strength.

Rev. 3 proposes moving the minimum classical security strength from 112 bits to 128 bits at the end of 2030

Our record: /nist-cryptographic-algorithm-deprecation-schedule/classical-algorithms-below-112-bit-security-strength/. Quoted from <https://www.encryptionconsulting.com/education-center/nist-ir-8547-sp-800-131a-algorithm-transitions/>, last checked 2026-11-15, due to be re-checked by 2027-05-14.

ECDH, ECDSA.

IR 8547’s proposed timeline: quantum-vulnerable public-key algorithms (RSA, ECDSA, ECDH, finite-field DH) are deprecated after 2030 and disallowed after 2035. Hybrid modes that combine an approved

Our record: /nist-cryptographic-algorithm-deprecation-schedule/ecdh/. Quoted from <https://www.encryptionconsulting.com/education-center/nist-ir-8547-sp-800-131a-algorithm-transitions/>, last checked 2026-11-15, due to be re-checked by 2027-05-14. Our record: /nist-cryptographic-algorithm-deprecation-schedule/ecdsa/. Quoted from <https://www.encryptionconsulting.com/education-center/nist-ir-8547-sp-800-131a-algorithm-transitions/>, last checked 2026-11-15, due to be re-checked by 2027-05-14.

EdDSA.

The IR 8547 Transition Timeline IR 8547 proposes a two-stage retirement for quantum-vulnerable public-key algorithms. Understanding the difference between the two stages is the whole point of the document. Stage | Date | What it means | Deprecated | After 2030 | The algorithm is still permitted but its use is discouraged. In practice, no longer acceptable for new deployments on federal systems. | Disallowed | After 2035 | The algorithm may no longer be used for the stated purpose. A disallowed signature scheme is treated as forgeable; a disallowed key-establishment scheme is treated as vulnerable to key recovery. | The algorithms on this schedule are the public-key workhorses of today’s internet: RSA and elliptic-curve signatures (ECDSA, EdDSA,

Our record: /nist-cryptographic-algorithm-deprecation-schedule/eddsa/. Quoted from <https://www.encryptionconsulting.com/education-center/nist-ir-8547-sp-800-131a-algorithm-transitions/>, last checked 2026-11-15, due to be re-checked by 2027-05-14.

Falcon.

Falcon digital signature algorithm and HQC key encapsulation mechanism were selected for ongoing standardization;

Our record: /nist-cryptographic-algorithm-deprecation-schedule/falcon/. Quoted from <https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/post-quantum-cryptography>, last checked 2026-11-15, due to be re-checked by 2027-05-14.

HQC.

HQC key encapsulation mechanism were selected for ongoing standardization;

Our record: /nist-cryptographic-algorithm-deprecation-schedule/hqc/. Quoted from <https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/post-quantum-cryptography>, last checked 2026-11-15, due to be re-checked by 2027-05-14.

ML-DSA (FIPS 204).

Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Standard (ML-DSA)

Our record: /nist-cryptographic-algorithm-deprecation-schedule/ml-dsa-fips-204/. Quoted from <https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/post-quantum-cryptography>, last checked 2026-11-15, due to be re-checked by 2027-05-14.

ML-KEM (FIPS 203).

Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism Standard (ML-KEM)

Our record: /nist-cryptographic-algorithm-deprecation-schedule/ml-kem-fips-203/. Quoted from <https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/post-quantum-cryptography>, last checked 2026-11-15, due to be re-checked by 2027-05-14.

RSA (signatures).

quantum-vulnerable public-key algorithms (RSA, ECDSA, ECDH, finite-field DH) are deprecated after 2030 and disallowed after 2035

Our record: /nist-cryptographic-algorithm-deprecation-schedule/rsa-signatures/. Quoted from <https://www.encryptionconsulting.com/education-center/nist-ir-8547-sp-800-131a-algorithm-transitions/>, last checked 2026-11-15, due to be re-checked by 2027-05-14.

RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 (signatures).

ECDSA, EdDSA, RSA-PSS, RSA PKCS#1 v1.5), and key-establishment schemes including RSA key transport, elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH), and finite-field Diffie-Hellman.

Our record: /nist-cryptographic-algorithm-deprecation-schedule/rsa-pkcs-1-v1-5-signatures/. Quoted from <https://www.encryptionconsulting.com/education-center/nist-ir-8547-sp-800-131a-algorithm-transitions/>, last checked 2026-11-15, due to be re-checked by 2027-05-14.

RSA key transport.

RSA key transport, elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH), and finite-field Diffie-Hellman. All are broken by Shor’s algorithm on a sufficiently powerful quantum computer, which is why migrating from RSA to ECC solves nothing here: both fall to the same attack. Deprecated Is Not the Same as Disallowed The practical reading: after 2030, RSA and ECDH are no longer acceptable for new deployments on US federal systems, but existing deployed systems have until 2035 to complete migration. The window between the two dates is the migration runway. Treating 2035 as the only deadline misses the point, because procurement, auditing, and cyber-insurance practices tend to tighten around the 2030 deprecation date, not the 2035 disallowance date. How Hybrid Modes Fit In IR 8547 explicitly supports hybrid cryptography during the transition. A hybrid scheme combines a classical algorithm with a post-quantum algorithm so the result stays secure unless both are broken. NIST has clarified that the 2035 disallowance of quantum-vulnerable algorithms is not intended to prohibit hybrid modes that incorporate an approved post-quantum algorithm alongside a classical one in a composite scheme.

Our record: /nist-cryptographic-algorithm-deprecation-schedule/rsa-key-transport/. Quoted from <https://www.encryptionconsulting.com/education-center/nist-ir-8547-sp-800-131a-algorithm-transitions/>, last checked 2026-11-15, due to be re-checked by 2027-05-14.

RSA-PSS.

The IR 8547 Transition Timeline IR 8547 proposes a two-stage retirement for quantum-vulnerable public-key algorithms. Understanding the difference between the two stages is the whole point of the document. Stage | Date | What it means | Deprecated | After 2030 | The algorithm is still permitted but its use is discouraged. In practice, no longer acceptable for new deployments on federal systems. | Disallowed | After 2035 | The algorithm may no longer be used for the stated purpose. A disallowed signature scheme is treated as forgeable; a disallowed key-establishment scheme is treated as vulnerable to key recovery. | The algorithms on this schedule are the public-key workhorses of today’s internet: RSA and elliptic-curve signatures (ECDSA, EdDSA, RSA-PSS,

Our record: /nist-cryptographic-algorithm-deprecation-schedule/rsa-pss/. Quoted from <https://www.encryptionconsulting.com/education-center/nist-ir-8547-sp-800-131a-algorithm-transitions/>, last checked 2026-11-15, due to be re-checked by 2027-05-14.

SHA-2 family, SHA-3 family.

SHA-2 and SHA-3 are not on the public-key schedule: These hash families remain secure against quantum attacks at appropriate output sizes.

Our record: /nist-cryptographic-algorithm-deprecation-schedule/sha-2-family/. Quoted from <https://www.encryptionconsulting.com/education-center/nist-ir-8547-sp-800-131a-algorithm-transitions/>, last checked 2026-11-15, due to be re-checked by 2027-05-14. Our record: /nist-cryptographic-algorithm-deprecation-schedule/sha-3-family/. Quoted from <https://www.encryptionconsulting.com/education-center/nist-ir-8547-sp-800-131a-algorithm-transitions/>, last checked 2026-11-15, due to be re-checked by 2027-05-14.

SLH-DSA (FIPS 205).

Stateless Hash-Based Digital Signature Standard (SLH-DSA)

Our record: /nist-cryptographic-algorithm-deprecation-schedule/slh-dsa-fips-205/. Quoted from <https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/post-quantum-cryptography>, last checked 2026-11-15, due to be re-checked by 2027-05-14.

finite-field Diffie-Hellman.

Under NIST IR 8547, quantum-vulnerable public-key algorithms are deprecated after 2030 and disallowed after 2035. What are the NIST 2030 and 2035 deadlines? Under the NIST IR 8547 draft timeline, quantum-vulnerable public-key algorithms (RSA, ECDSA, ECDH, finite-field Diffie-Hellman)

Our record: /nist-cryptographic-algorithm-deprecation-schedule/finite-field-diffie-hellman/. Quoted from <https://www.encryptionconsulting.com/education-center/nist-ir-8547-sp-800-131a-algorithm-transitions/>, last checked 2026-11-15, due to be re-checked by 2027-05-14.

What these requirements do not say

The certificate-lifetime rules name no algorithm and no key size. They are about how long a certificate and its validation may live, nothing else.

Checked, not asserted: none of RSA, AES, key size, elliptic appears anywhere in the six provisions we hold of the validity and reuse rows above. That is a search of the publisher's own words, and it is what the gate on this page tests; if one of those words turned up, this page would stop being built.

Hash and signature deadlines exist in the same document, and the dataset holds them; they are separate rows with separate dates. The point is only that a shorter certificate does not make a weak algorithm acceptable, and retiring an algorithm does not change the certificate clock.

The same answer for a machine

The other questions answered here

Does HIPAA apply to my app?, What does HIPAA require software to do?, Does HIPAA require encryption at rest, and which algorithm?, What must I log for HIPAA, and how long must records be kept?, What session timeout do HIPAA and NIST require?, What password rules does NIST state?, Do I need multi-factor sign-in, and under which rule?, How fast must I report a breach, by law and by state?, Which state privacy laws apply to my app, by revenue and number of consumers?, Which NIST 800-53 controls bear on a database, on object storage, on logs and on backups?, What is SOC 2, and what in it can and cannot be quoted for free?.

All of them are listed on the question list.

What this page is

This page is assembled automatically out of the records named on it. No sentence of a rule on it is ours: every one is quoted from the publisher that wrote it, with a link to the page it was quoted from and the date we last checked that page.

SOC 2, ISO/IEC 27001 and PCI DSS are not quoted anywhere on these pages. The bodies that write those documents sell the text, and our position, written down in our constitution, is that facts plus a short attributed quote with a link are fine but republishing licensed text is not. So nothing here quotes a trust services criterion or an ISO clause. What can be quoted is the rules the public bodies publish — the HIPAA Security Rule, NIST SP 800-53, federal retention regulations, state statutes and the CA/Browser Forum's requirements — and that is what every answer here is built out of.

This is not legal advice and it is not a statement that any system complies with anything. A provision quoted here is a sentence from a published document, not a finding about your software. Who decides: your own counsel, your auditor, and the regulator.